

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ADP-00 CIAE-00

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PRS-01 SS-15 EUR-25 NEA-10 GAC-01 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-12

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O P 091958 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8392

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USDEL SALT TWO II

USMISSION GENEVA

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ALL OTHER MBFR CAPITALS BY POUCH

FROM US REP MBFR.

FOR ANKARA: PLEASE PASS TEXT OF REPORT TO TURKISH FOREIGN  
MINISTRY AT REQUEST OF TURKISH MBFR REP TULEMAN.

ALL ADDRESSEES: PLEASE NOTE DELETION OF "NOFORN" DESIGNATION,  
AS WELL AS TEXTUAL CHANGES IN MESSAGE. AS REVISED TEXT HAS BEEN  
DISSEMINATED TO MBFR AD HOC GROUP IN VINNA, THIS MESSAGE SHOULD  
REPLACE VIENNA 2842 TRANSMITTED 8 APRIL 1973.

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EO: 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS APRIL 7

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN LONG, VIGOROUSLY CONTESTED SESSION ON HUNGARIAN ISSUE WITH NETHERLANDS AND US REPS ON APRIL 7, SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND KVITSINSKIY, SPEAKING WITH CONSIDERABLE FRANKNESS, DEVELOPED A POSITION ON HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION AND THE PROCEDURES PAPER WHICH THEY INDICATED REPRESENTED THE ABSOLUTELY FINAL SOVIET POSITION. NETHERLANDS AND US REPS REPRESENTED ALLIED POSITIONS ON ALL OPEN ISSUES AND MADE SOME HEADWAY ON LESS IMPORTANT POINTS. THEY STRESSED TWO POSSIBILITIES OF KEEPING HUNGARY IN ABEYANCE, EITHER A SENTENCE TO BE INCLUDED IN AN ENLARGEMENT FORMULA OR THROUGH USE OF COMPLEMENTARY STATEMENTS. ALTHOUGH ALLIED REPS URGED ADVANTAGES OF THE FIRST APPROACH AT LEAST A DOZEN TIMES, SOVIET REPS FIRMLY REJECTED THIS POSSIBILITY. THEY INSISTED THAT HUNGARY MUST BE LISTED AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT, BUT SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT AN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS, WHICH THEY CLAIMED COULD GUARANTEE THE ALLIED RIGHT TO RAISE THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE IN NEGOTIATIONS. NETHERLANDS AND US REPS CONSIDER THAT THE CURRENT EXPLORATORY PHASE MAY BE REACHING A POINT OF CULMINATION. THEY WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITON TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT ON THIS POINT FOLLOWING THE NEXT SESSION WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH IS NOW SET FOR THE MORNING OF 10 PARIL. END SUMMARY.

2. IN AN INTENSE 6- HOUR DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS APRIL 7, ALLIED REPS REVIEWED ALL DISPUTED POINTS ON PROCEDURES PAPER. SOVIET REPS SPOKE WITH GRETER OPENNESS THAN USUAL POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF HUNGARIANS. DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON THE ENLARGEMENT CONCEPT. ALLIED REPS EMPHASIZED THAT THE APPROACH THEY HAD ADV

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O P 091958 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8393

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

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USDEL SALT TWO II  
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OF THE SOVIET REPS: THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ACCEPT IN THIS PAPER THE USE OF THE FORMULA " STATES HAVING TERRITORY OR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE." THIS FORMULA WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THERE WAS A CENTRAL EUROPEAN STRATEGIC SECURITY AREA BECAUSE IT WAS BASED SOLELY ON GEOGRAPHY. IF THE ALLIES WISHED TO EXPAND THEIR PHRASE AND MAKE A REFERENCE TO STATES HAVING TERRITORY OR FORCES IN THE STRATEGIC AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, THIS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE PRESENT FORMULATION TROOPS OR TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE UNDER ANY CONCITIONS. WHATEVER OBJECTIVE MERIT THIS FORMULA MAY HAVE HAD ORIGINALLY, IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT CONSULTATION, IT HAD TAKEN ON THE  
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DEFINITE CONNOTATION OF AN EXCLUSIVELY GEOGRAPHIC CRITERIA OF DEFINING CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH IF ACCEPTED WOULD PREJUDICE THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE ALLIED VIEW THAT HUNGARY WAS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND SHOULD HENCE AUTOMATICALLY BE ACCEPTED AS A FULL PARTICIPANT. AFTER A FURTHER HALF- HOUR OF DISCUSSION, IN WHICH ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO URGE THE USE OF THE FORMULA ON TERRITORY OR FORCES, CATEGORICALLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE PHRASE " CONCERN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES OR ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE," AND URGED THE USE OF THE DESIGNATOR " DIRECT PARTICIPANTS", SOVIET REPS STATED THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: " REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOLLOWING STATES, WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS RELATED TO CENTRAL EUROPE, WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS BY CONSENSUS."

5. THERE FOLLOWED EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED SOVIET ENLARGEMENT FORMULA. ALLIED REPS URGED ACCEPTANCE IN TOTO OF THE FORMULA THEY HAD ADVANCED ON APRIL 6 WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: " IF ANOTHER STATE HAVING TERRITORY OR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WISHES TO BE INCLUDED AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND THIS IS AGREED BY CONSENSUS OF PARTICIPANTS LISTED IN THIS PARAGRAPH, IT MAY BE SO INCLUDED. SUCH INCLUSION IN NEGOTIATIONS OR DECISIONS RELATED TO CENTRAL EUROPE COULD EITHER BE GENERAL OR, IF SO AGREED, COULD BE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF TAKING PAR IN A PARTICULAR DECISION OR DECISIONS RELATED TO THIS SUBJECT. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT COUNTRIES WITH TERRITORY OR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE OTHER THAN THOSE LISTED ABOVE ( REFERENCE IS TO LIST OF 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS) WILL PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES IS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE STATUS

AGREED DURING THESE CONSULTATIONS AND WILL BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED DURING THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS."

6. SOVIET REPS ONCE AGAIN SAID THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY REFERENCE TO THE FORMULA " TERRITORY OR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE" IN THE ENLARGEMENT FORMULA OR PARTICULARLY IN AT ITS OUTSET, WHERE IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ONCE AND FOR ALL ELIMINATING ANY POSSIBILITY OF THEIR RAISING THE POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF ITALY IN AGREEMENTS OR INDIVIDUAL MEASURES IF THE ALLIES RAISED THE CONCEPT THAT HUNGARY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN MEASURES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED REPS POINTED OUT THAT IF THIS LIMITED PHRASE WERE REMOVED, THE SOVIETS MIGHT SUGGEST THE ADDITION OF EITHER SOUTHERN FLANK ALLIED STATES. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE COULD HERE AND NOW STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT INTEND TO INVOLVE GREECE AND TURKEY  
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IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS OR IN MEASURES IN THE EVENT THE ALLIES RAISED THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY DURING THE PENDING NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO TELL THE TURKISH AND GREEK REPS THIS DIRECTLY IF THEY WANTED TO HEAR IT FROM HIM. AFTER EXTENSIVE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET AND ALLIED TEXTS, KVITSINSKIY SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT THE FOLLOWING WORDING ON THE ENLARGEMENT CONCEPT: " IF ANOTHER STATE WISHES TO BE INCLUDED AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THIS IS AGREED BY CONSENSUS OF PARTICIPANTS LISTED IN THIS PARAGRAPH, IF MAY BE SO INCLUDED. SUCH INCLUSION IN NEGOTIATIONS OR DECISIONS RELATED TO CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD EITHER BE GENERAL OR, IF SO AGREED, COULD BE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF TAKING PART IN A PARTICULAR DECISION OR DECISIONS RELATING TO THIS SUBJECT."

7. US AND NETHERLANDS REPS AGAIN URGED INCLUSION OF PHRASE REFERRING TO TERRITORY OR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT OUTSET OF THIS LANGUAGE. SOVIET REPS REJECTED THIS OUT OF HAND AND SAID IT WAS A WASTE OF TIME TO TALK IN THESE TERMS. ALLIED REPS AGAIN RAISED THE ADDITION OF THE LANGUAGE THEY HAD PROPOSED ON KEEPING HUNGARY IN ABEYANCE (I. E., " THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT COUNTRIES WITH TERRITORY OR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE OTHER THAN THOSE LISTED ABOVE, ETC"). KVITSINSKIY SAID THIS WAS A BAD FORMULA, ADVERSE TO SOVIET INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE DROPPED. SOVIET REPS ASKED ABOUT THE SENTENCE THEY HAD PROPOSED TO CONCLUDE THIS SECTION, " THIS SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE PARTIES." ALLIED REPS SAID ALLIES DID NOT LIKE THIS LANGUAGE BECAUSE OF ITS VAGUENESS WHICH MIGHT IMPEDE DISCUSSION OF ENLARGEMENT EVEN IF THE SOVIET ENLARGEMENT FORMULA SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. SOVIET REPS PERSISTED. ALLIED REPS SAID THEY WOULD ADVANCE A FORMULA ON SECURITY IF THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT THEIR FORMULATION FOR THIS PARAGRAPH ON LEAVING HUNGARY OPEN. SOVIET REPS SAID THAT THIS DEAL WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THEY SAID THEY WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO HAVE ANY ENLARGEMENT FORMULA UNLESS THERE WAS SOME REFERENCE TO SECURITY. AFTER EXTENSIVE FURTHER DISCUSSION, THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED THE PHRASE, " IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH ADDITIONAL PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS,

AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE PARTIES". ALLIED REPS SAID THEY WOULD RESERVE THEIR POSITION. NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT THE ENLARGEMENT FORMULA MIGHT BE APPROVED IN THE VIEW OF SOME BY SUBSTITUTING THE PHRASE, " AT THEIR INITIATIVE" OR " AT THEIR REQUEST" FOR THE WORD " WISHES." AFTER CONFERRING WITH KHLESTOV, KVITSINSKIY SAID THIS CHANGE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY COULD APPLY ALSO TO ALLIED EFFORTS

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O P 091958 Z APR 73  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8394  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
USNMR SHAPE  
USLOSACLANT  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USDEL SALT TWO II  
USMISSION GENEVA

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9. ALLIED REPS SAID THAT IF HUNGARY WERE NOT TO BE LISTED AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A FULL ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVITS WOULD NOT CITE THIS FACT AGAINST THEM IF THEY RAISED HUNGARY IN THE PENDING NEGOTIATIONS. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS BY THE ALLIES ON ONE SIDE AND THE HUNGARIANS ON THE OTHER. THE ALLIES COULD SAY WHAT THEY HAD INDICATED THEY WISHED TO SAY AND THE HUNGARIANS COULD REPLY IN A WAY WHICH

MIGHT NOW BE DISCUSSED. SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS WOULD, WHILE NOT ESPECIALLY PALATABLE TO THE SOVIETS, IN HIS VIEW ABSOLUTELY ASSURE THE ALLIED RIGHT TO RAISE THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION DURING THE SECRET

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NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT HAVING ANYTHING IN THE PROCEDURES TEXT CITED AGAINST THEM. ALLIED REPS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM BUT SAID THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO LISTEN TO SOVIET PROPOSALS.

10. KVITSINSKIY THEN SAID THE SOVIETS ENVISAGED THAT THE ALLIED STATEMENT WOULD COME FIRST, AND THE HUNGARIAN STATEMENT WOULD BE CONCEIVED AS A REPLY. HE ASSUMED THE ALLIED STATEMENT WOULD START WITH THE PHRASE, " THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BLANK WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY IN THESE CONSULTATIONS" AND WOULD GO ON FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE ALLIED STATEMENT. THE REMAINING ALLIED STATEMENT WAS VERY LONG. COULD IT BE SHORTENED? ALLIED REPS SAID IT COULD NOT. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, SOVIET REPS QUESTIONED THE PHRASE " IT IS AGREED" IN SUGGESTED ALLIED LANGUAGE. THEY SAID IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO IMPLY IN STATEMENT THAT EAST HAD EXPLICITLY AGREED TO THIS PROPOSITION. ALLIED REPS SAID THIS MIGHT BE CHANGED TO " IT IS CONSIDERED" SO THAT THE POSSIBLE ALLIED STATEMENT WOULD READ, " THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BLANK WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY IN THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE NATURE OF HUNGARY' S PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, DECISIONS OR AGREED MEASURES OR TO THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY. IN PARTICULAR, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES MUST BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED DURING THE PENDING NEGOTIATIONS."

11. KVITSINSKIY THEN DEVELOPED POSSIBLE EASTERN RESPONSE AS FOLLOWS, " IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BLANK, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY STATES AS FOLLOWS: THE UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL NOT BE BINDING FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS IS NOT EXCLUDED BUT COULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT KNOWN CONDITIONS WOULD BE FULFILLED WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED IN THE PRESENT CONSULTATIONS BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, I. E., ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT ITALY ALSO PARTICIPATES IN SUCH MEASURES."

12. ALLIED REPS SAID THAT HUNGARIAN STATEMENT AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE. WHAT WAS THE POINT OF SUCH A STATEMENT IF IT STATED THAT THE ALLIED STATEMENT WAS NO BINDING AND IF IT MENTIONED ITALY? FOLLOWING ANOTHER HALF-HOUR' S INTENSE DISCUSSION, KVITSINSKIY SAID THE SOVIETS MIGHT CONSIDER SECRET

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DROPPING THE REFERENCE TO THE WESTERN STATEMENT NOT BEING BINDING AND DROP MENTION OF ITALY, BUT ONLY UNDER CERTAIN SPECIFIED CONDITIONS. THESE WOULD BE THAT HUNGARY APPEARED IN THE LIST OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS AND THAT THE REMAINING TEXT AS SOVIET REPS HAD OUTLINED WOULD BE ACCEPTED IN FULL BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND THE NATO COUNCIL. IN THAT EVENT, AND ONLY IN THAT EVENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO CHANGE THE LANGUAGE OF THE EASTERN RESPONSE. IN THIS CASE IT MIGHT READ AS FOLLOWS. " IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BLANK, WHICH REFLECTS THE UNILATERAL VIEWS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY WISHES TO STATE THAT, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST STATES HAVE EXPLAINED DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONSULTATIONS, HUNGARY COULD CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN POSSIBLE DECISION, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES ONLY IF THE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLED."

13. KHLESTOV AND KVITSINSKIY STRESSED THAT THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE NOW AND WOULD DO SO SOLELY AND ONLY IF THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO AGREE TO THE TEXT THEY HAD OUTLINED. THEY WERE NOT EMPOWERED TO PROPOSE, MUCH LESS TO ACCEPT, THESE CHANGES AND IT COULD ONLY BE GOTTEN THROUGH AGAINST STIFF OPPOSITION ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO HAD INSISTED THAT ITALY MUST BE MENTIONED ANYTIME HUNGARY WAS MENTIONED AND WHO HAD INSISTED THAT HUNGARY NOT BE SINGLED OUT. EVEN SO, THEY WERE NOT SURE THEY WOULD GET FULL APPROVAL ON THE SEVERAL CHANGES IN THE PROCEDURES TEXT WHICH HAD EMERGED DURING THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WHICH DEVIATED FROM THEIR INSTRUCTIONS.

14. ALLIED REPS SAID THIS PROPOSAL WAS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIETS. NATURALLY, THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY LISTING OF HUNGARY AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT AND THE SOVIET REPS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THIS. ALLIED REPS SAID THAT THESE TEXTS DID NOT APPEAR PRODUCTIVE TO THEM, NOT TO MENTION THE OVERALL SOVIET CONCEPT, BUT WHERE WOULD THE TEXTS OF THESE STATEMENTS APPEAR IN ANY CASE? KHLESTOV SUGGESTED THAT THEY TAKE THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL TO BE CIRCULATED AMONG ALL 19 PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED REPS SAID IF ANY STATEMENTS WERE TO BE MADE, THEY MUST BE PART OF THE PROCEDURES DOCUMENT. ASSUMING THAT HUNGARY WOULD APPEAR IN NEITHER THE LIST OF DIRECT NOR SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS, SUCH STATEMENTS SHOULD AT THE VERY LEAST BE ANNEXED TO THE PROCEDURES PAPER. KHLESTOV SUGGESTED THAT THE PROCEDURES PAPER BE ADOPTED BY BEING READ BY THE CHAIRMAN IN THE FIRST PLENARY

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SESSION. THE EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS COULD THEN TAKE PLACE AND TOGETHER WITH THE TEXT OF THE PROCEDURES PAPER, THEIR TEXT WOULD APPEAR IN A PROTOCOL OF THAT DAY'S PROCEEDINGS ISSUED BY THE CHAIRMAN TO THE DELEGATIONS. ALLIED REPS SAID THIS WOULD BE INADEQUATE AND THAT ANY STATEMENTS IF THIS APPROACH WERE TO BE USED WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT. THE

QUESTION WAS NOT PURSUED FURTHER.

15. ALLIED REPS SAID THAT, NOW THAT THEY HAD SOME OVERVIEW OF WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND, THEY DID NOT FIND IT ATTRACTIVE. THE

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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SOVIETS HAD OFFERED AN ENLARGEMENT FORMULA AND AN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS OF QUESTIONABLE VALUE. TO BE REALISTIC, IN WHAT WAY WOULD THIS REALLY MEET ALLIED INTERESTS NAD HOW COULD IT BE CONSIDERED A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT? KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD THE ALLIES FROM THE OUTSET THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO HAVE HUNGARY AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. THIS WAS THE BASIC AND ESSENTIAL SOVIET POSITION. THE ALLIES HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS POSITION. TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST CONCENTRATED ALLIED PRESSURE, THE SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE HUNGARY PARTICIPATE IF ITALY DID ALSO. NOW THEY HAD TAKEN TWO IMPORTANT AND FINAL STEPS. THEY WERE WILLING TO INCLUDE A GENERAL ENLARGEMENT FORMULA WHICH BY ITSELF ASSURED THE ALLIED RIGHT TO RAISE THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION. TODAY, THEY HAD STATED THEY

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WOULD IN ADDITION BE WILLING TO ACCEPT WITHOUT CONTRADICTION AN ALLIED STATEMENT THAT THE ALLIES INTENDED TO RAISE THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND BRING IT TO A DECISION. IT WAS TRUE THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WAS NOT BINDING UNDER THE NORMAL PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN WILLING TO DROP THE OFFENSIVE WORD THAT IT WAS NOT BINDING. THEY MIGHT ALSO BE WILLING TO DROP THE MENTION OF ITALY AS A CONDITION FOR POSSIBLE HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE MEASURES. HE REALIZED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT CONSIDER THE OUTCOME PLEASING. BUT THEY SHOULD REALIZE ALSO THAT IT GAVE THEM WHAT THEY WANTED -- A SPECIFIC MENTION THAT HUNGARY WAS IN ABEYANCE AND AN UNCONTESTED RIGHT TO RAISE THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIES SHOULD REALIZE THAT IT WAS EQUALLY UNPLEASANT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT SUCH AN OUTCOME. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT HUNGARY IN THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IT WAS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ENLARGEMENT. EVEN THE INCLUSION OF FRANCE WAS NOT ALL THAT IMPORTANT BECAUSE THERE WERE OTHER COMPENSATIONS FROM ITS ABSENCE. THE SOVIETS WANTED TO MOVE ON IN THE PRESENT TALKS. IF THE ALLIES DID NOT WANT TO ACCEPT HIS PROPOSAL, THE DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE A FURTHER TWO MONTHS OR A FURTHER 10 MONTHS. BUT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE THE SAME. THIS WAS ALL THE SOVIETS COULD OR WOULD GIVE ON THIS POINT.

16. ALLIED REPS SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS OVERLY MECHANISTIC. IT WAS NOT COMMON SENSE TO SAY NOW UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS THE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. THERE MIGHT BE OTHER NEGOTIATING ASPECTS WHICH THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES WOULD WISH TO PURSUE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. KVVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT IT WAS PREMATURE NOW TO SPECIFY UNDER WHAT PRECISE CONDITIONS THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE MIGHT BE DEBATED IN NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET REPS HAD AFTER ALL SUGGESTED IT MIGHT UNDER CERTAIN SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES BE POSSIBLE TO DROP MENTION OF ITALY IN FAVOR OF A MORE GENERAL CONCEPT OF APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD RECONCILED THEMSELVES TO THE IDEA THAT IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THEIR ORIGINAL DESIRES, THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION WOULD COME UP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WERE WILLING TO PUT THIS IN WRITING. WHAT MORE COULD THE ALLIES REASONABLY EXPECT?

17. ALLIED REPS SAID THEY DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER BEFORE CONSULTING THEIR COLLEAGUES. SOVIET REPS STATED THEY WISHED TO  
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CHECK THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION WITH MOSCOW AND THAT THEY WOULD CONFIRM WHETHER THE DEPARTURES THEY SAID THEY HAD MADE FROM THEIR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURES PAPER IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUS-

SIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTED. THEY SAID THEY ALSO WISHED TO DISCUSS THE OUTCOME WITH THEIR ALIES LOCALLY FOR THE SAME PURPOSE, PARTICULARLY WITH HUNGARIAN REP USTOR WHO WAS ABSENT FOR THE WEEKEND. THEY SUGGESTED A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING FOR THE MORNINF OF APRIL 10, FOCUSsing ON THE CONCEPT OF THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES IN ORDER TO PUT IT ON RECORD WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP INCLUDING HUNGARY AND TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE ALLIED STATEMENT, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A SESSION ON APRIL 11 OR 12 IN WHICH THEY MIGHT PRODUCE " A FINAL EDITION" OF THEIR PROCEDURES PAPER INCORPORATING CHANGES TO WHICH THEIR AUTHORITIES WERE WILLING TO AGREE. IT WAS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON APRIL 10. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <29-Aug-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 971216  
**Subject:** MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS APRIL 7  
**TAGS:** PARM, AU  
**To:** STATE INFO SECDEF  
ANKARA  
BONN  
HELSINKI  
MOSCOW  
NATO  
USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
SALT TWO II  
GENEVA

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005